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Notes
Taking TRIPS to the Eleventh
Amendment: The Aftermath of the
College Savings Cases
by
JOHN O'CONNOR*

The Congress shaH have power... [t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
1
Discoveries.
In determining that certain constitutional protections were
applicable against the states, Justice Clark said, "There is no war
between the Constitution and common sense."' 2 Traditional notions

of common sense are of limited use, however, when the Supreme
Court finds powers and rights, derived not from the literal words of
the Constitution, but inferred from the structure of the Constitution.
In a recent series of cases, the Supreme Court has sought to resolve
conflicts between several of these unenumerated "emanations" of
powers and rights-specifically, the conflict between Eleventh
Amendment-based state sovereign immunity and Fourteenth
Amendment-based congressional power to abrogate that immunity.
* J.D., 2000, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; M.A., 1995,
Annenberg School, University of Southern California; B.A., 1994, Pomona College. I
would like to thank Joel Paul and Calvin Massey for their valuable comments on an earlier
draft, Celeste Pace, Gene Litvinoff, and Iver Larson for editing and advice, and to
Radhika Rao, William S. Dodge and Joseph Grodin for inspiration and encouragement.
All errors are the author's own. The author apologizes for the title and dedicates this
Note to his brother Christopher. apostrofe@aol.com.
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,657 (1961).
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The context for this resolution was intellectual property law. In the
aftermath of these cases, however, the "resolution" of these
conflicting emanations may cause more problems for Congress, the
Judiciary, and the intellectual property holder.
In 1999, the Supreme Court handed down two opinions that,
together, represent the zenith of a line of precedent that has
dramatically redefined the relationship between federal government
and the states. The decisions cemented an extension of the doctrine
of sovereign immunity to previously unimaginable limits and, in the
process, seriously curtailed the protection available to patent and
trademark holders from infringement by states and state entities.
The two decisions began as one case in the same courtroom in
New Jersey. The first, College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Education Expense Board3 ("College Savings")
overturned aspects of the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act4
("TRCA") that made the trademark laws applicable against the states
and state entities. The second, Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank 5 ("Florida
Prepaid") overturned aspects of the Patent Remedy Act 6 ("PRA")
that made the patent laws applicable against states and state entities.
In the 1980s and '90s, Congress had passed these acts to make the
Trademark and Patent laws applicable against the states in light of
court cases7 holding individual states immune under the Eleventh
Amendment. Congress justified the enactment of these statutes
under powers delegated to it under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Section 5 allows Congress to pass legislation to enforce
the provisions of the other clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Despite this assertion of constitutional power, the Supreme Court, in
the College Savings cases, ruled that Congress had improperly
attempted to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity.
As a result of the College Savings cases, any governmental entity
otherwise immune to suit under the Eleventh Amendment can now
infringe on a patent, a trademark, and perhaps even copyrighted
material, with little fear of being haled into federal court on statutory
causes of action. Affected public entities include most public
universities and research facilities.
In fact, the University of
3. 527 U.S. 666 (1999) [hereinafter College Savings]. Note that I sometimes use
College Savings to refer to the cases together.

4.
5.
6.
7.

15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994).
527 U.S. 627 (1999) [hereinafter FloridaPrepaid].
35 U.S.C. § 271(h) (1994).
See, e.g., Chew v. California, 893 F.2d 331 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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California has already used the College Savings cases to try to get a
patent infringement suit dismissed.8 Because the College Savings
cases do not prevent state entities, such as the University of
California, from suing to protect their patents and trademarks,

fundamental issues of fairness are directly implicated. With the
University of California holding claim to hundreds of patents, all of
which may or may not infringe upon other patents, the stakes are
enormous.
Indeed, as courts have expanded the scope of

patentability, 9 a larger and larger number of patents are bound to be
implicated.
The purpose of this Note is to discuss and suggest avenues of
action that will protect intellectual property from infringement by
states and state entities within the confines of the Supreme Court's

new rules for sovereign immunity.
Legislative and judicial
approaches will be discussed, as well as an alternative perspective on
legislative remedies that Congress could implement. 10
Part I of this Note outlines the Court's recent abrogation
doctrine and considers to what extent it represents another form of

substantive due process. Part II discusses how, according to the
Supreme Court in the College Savings cases, Congress failed to meet

the Court's standards for abrogation of sovereign immunity in the
trademark and patent remedy acts. Part III asserts that the time is

ripe for a reassessment of Eleventh Amendment standards, which
might, to some extent, remedy these issues. Part IV suggests how
8. See New Star Lasers, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 63 F. Supp. 2d 1240, 1241
(E.D. Cal. 1999).
9. See, e.g., State Street Bank & Trust, Co v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d
1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (expanding the availability of business method patents).
10. Some of this ground has been covered in other works. See generally Scott
Glauberman, Citizen Suits Against States: The Exclusive Jurisdiction Dilemma, 45 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 63 (Fall, 1997). The Glauberman piece presciently asserted
that Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida,517 U.S. 44 (1996), spelled the end for copyright
infringement by state entities. Glauberman considered alternatives open to a hypothetical
copyright holder when a state university negligently infringed upon the copyrighted
material. These included a takings cause of action and recourse to abrogation doctrine
and the congressional spending power. Likewise, one commentator, Andrew S.
Wiliamson, examined the impact of Seminole Tribe, on various statutes that purported to
abrogate sovereign immunity, including the copyright, patent, bankruptcy, and Clean
Water Acts. See Andrew S. Williamson, Note, Policing the States after Seminole, 85 GEO.
L.J. 1739, 1747-57 (1997). Williamson then discussed abrogation of state sovereign
immunity pursuant to the conditional spending power, as well as recourse to ex rel. and qui
tam alternatives. Neither included a re-examination of Eleventh Amendment standards,
nor abrogation through the treaty power. Also, neither article had the advantage of the
College Savings cases, Kimel v. Florida,120 S. Ct. 631 (2000), or Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S.
706 (1999). Where other similarities or differences arise they will be noted.
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patent holders might immediately protect their patents and
trademarks by resorting to other, mostly constitutional, causes of
action. Part IV also discusses the advantages and disadvantages of
these causes of action, which include suits under the Takings Clause,
suits alleging violations of procedural due process, and general
declaratory relief. Part V explores various legislative alternatives
open to Congress after College Savings and Kimel v. FloridaBoard of
Regents," including alternatives available under the Spending Power,
the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Treaty Power, while another
legislative alternative rests on the uniqueness of the intellectual
property system.
Finally, Part VI assesses a recent bill, the
Intellectual Property Restoration Act, and determines whether the
methods used show if Congress is on the right track to an effective,
and constitutional, remedy.
I. The Abrogation Doctrine in Context
The Eleventh Amendment states: "The Judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State."'1 2 This "deceptively simple"' 3 text was not a part of the
original Bill of Rights; it was ratified in reaction to the Supreme
Court's decision in Chisholm v. Georgia14 which stated that a citizen
of one state could bring another state into federal court in his home
state.' 5 This decision, although seemingly based on Article I of the
Constitution, reportedly "sent shock waves"' 6 through the country
(or, at least, through the state legislatures) resulting in the Eleventh
7
Amendment's ratification shortly thereafter.
Since then, however, the protections of the Eleventh
Amendment have been expanded far beyond its literal text. 8 Since
11. 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000). Kimel addressed the applicability of Title VII to states and is
discussed below in Part I. See id.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
13. Calvin R. Massey, State Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56
U. CHI. L. REv. 61, 61 (1989).
14. 2 U.S. (2 Dali.) 419 (1793).
15. See id.
16. See Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 325 (1934).
17. For an examination of the history of the Eleventh Amendment and its
interpretations, see Carlos Manuel Vazquez, What Is Eleventh Amendment Immunity?,
106 YALE L.J. 1683, 1693-99 (1997).
18. See, e.g., Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991) ("[W]e
have understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for
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1890, for example, the Court has held that the protections extend to
suits against states from their own citizens. 19 In Hans v. Louisiana,
the plaintiff, a citizen of Louisiana, brought a suit against the state for
impairment of contract in federal court. 20 Louisiana argued that the
protections of the Eleventh Amendment prevented this suit from
proceeding.2t The Supreme Court thought that the mistake of the
Chisholm Court was to accept the literal language of Article III; that
"the judicial power shall extend to all... Controversies... between a
State and Citizens of another State, ... and between a State... and

foreign States, Citizens or Subjects, '22 included suits brought by a
citizen of one state against another state. The Hans Court cited the
Federalist No. 85 and other ratification debates for the proposition
that the Constitution did not mean what it said it meant.23 Rather, all
Article III meant was that if a state pursued a cause of action against a
citizen of another state, the case could be brought in federal court.24
The contrary action, of a citizen against another state, was forbidden.
To hold otherwise, the Court said, would be an "absurdity."25 No
attempt was made to find a constitutional peg for sovereign
immunity; it was merely a doctrine to be inferred from background
principles. 26 The correct interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment
has spawned considerable scholarly and judicial debate since then,
but is mostly beyond the scope of this Note.27
Determining whether a governmental entity is such a part of the
state government sufficient to afford it sovereign immunity under the
Eleventh Amendment requires an examination of various factors that
vary from circuit to circuit. For example, the Ninth Circuit examines
whether the state's treasury would be liable for a judgment against
the entity, as well as "performance by the entity of an essential
government function,... power to take property in its own name or

the presupposition... which it confirms.").
19. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 21 (1890). See also Exparte New York, 256 U.S.
490,497-98 (1921).
20. See Hans, 134 U.S. at 10-11.
21. See id.
22. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl.
1.
23. See Hans, 134 U.S. at 12-15.
24. See id. at 14.
25. See id. at 15.
26. Professor Massey suggests that sovereign immunity is more properly understood as
emanating from the Tenth, rather than the Eleventh, Amendment. See Massey, supranote
13, at 151.
27. See, e.g., Massey, supra note 13.
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in the name of the State, and corporate status of the entity. ' 28 Under
these factors, the Regents of the University of California have long
been held to be immune from litigation under the Eleventh
Amendment. 29 Any state can waive sovereign immunity on any
terms, if it wishes, and so allow a suit against it in either federal or its
30
own state courts.
An interesting problem emerges when the United States
Congress attempts to pass legislation that limits a state's ability to
raise sovereign immunity as a defense in a private action, called
"abrogation." Historically, it was assumed that Congress had the
intrinsic power (pursuant to an otherwise valid exercise of power) to
abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity 3' so long as congressional
intent was "unmistakably clear in the language of the statute." 32 In

Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, the Court overturned years of
precedent and stated that no longer would the "clear language"

provision alone Suffice. 33 Rather, the Court would now look closely
at the statute to determine whether Congress acted pursuant to a
valid grant of constitutional authority. 34
In Seminole Tribe, the Court applied the abrogation doctrine to a
congressional act requiring states to negotiate with Indian tribes in

good faith.35 Congress had enacted the legislation pursuant to its
Article I power to regulate Indian commerce. 36 Prior to Seminole
Tribe, the Court had determined that Congress had the power to

abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to Article I powers such
as the Indian or the Interstate Commerce Clause (or the Patent
28. See Hutchison v. Lake Oswego Sch. Dist. No. 7,519 F.2d 961,966 (9th Cir. 1975).
29. See Thompson v. Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1443 (9th Cir. 1980) (noting that the
University of California has been considered immune since 1934).
30. See Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 47-48 (1883).
31. Although whether Congress has or had this power pursuant to any constitutional
grant of power or pursuant only to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is subject to
debate. Various Justices have argued over the exact parameters of the power of
abrogation. One of the more interesting cases in this vein is Pennsylvania v. Union Gas
Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989). Compare id. at 13-19 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion) (asserting
that abrogation was viable under the Commerce Clause) with id. at 30-42 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that abrogation could only be done
pursuant to Section 5).
32. See Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985); see also Atascadero State Hosp. v.
Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234,240 (1985).
33. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 77 (1996) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (explaining how Seminole Tribe represented a "sharp break with the past").
The majority disagreed with this reading. See id. at 71-72.
34. See id. at 55.
35. See id. at 47.
36. See id at 52; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
3.
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Clause). 37 But the Court overruled this precedent and also found that
Congress lacked the power to abrogate under Article Ps The Court
recognized, however, that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,
does grant Congress the power of abrogation. 39 This is in large part

because the Fourteenth Amendment was passed after the Eleventh
Amendment and had, as one of its purposes, the goal of limiting state
power. 40 Logically, since the Eleventh Amendment was passed after
the Constitution and the Commerce Clause, the provisions of the

Articles could not be used to abrogate Eleventh Amendment
immunity. 41 The Fourteenth Amendment, on the other hand,
affirmatively grants the power to abrogate to Congress, since the
Fourteenth Amendment was passed after the Eleventh

Amendment.42
Moreover, the Supreme Court, in the landmark decision City of
Boerne v. Flores ("City of Boerne") extolled this power of Congress

to fulfill its obligation under Section 5: "It is for Congress in the first
instance to 'determine whether and what legislation is needed to
secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment,' and its

conclusions are entitled to much deference." 43 The constraints on
Congress' power are not limited to the literal text of Section 5 (or the
rest of the Fourteenth Amendment, presumably), "[r]ather, Congress'
power 'to enforce' the Amendment includes the authority both to

remedy and to deter violation of rights guaranteed thereunder by
prohibiting a somewhat broader swath of conduct, including that
which is not itself forbidden by the Amendment's text." 44
At the same time that it has recognized this right, however, the
37. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59-60 (citing Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491

U.S. 1, 19-20 (1989)).
38. See id. at 72-73.
39. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976). "[T]he Eleventh Amendment,
and the principle of state sovereignty which it embodies, are necessarily limited by the
enforcement provisions of Sec. 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. (citation omitted).
40. See id.
41. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, 491 U.S. 1, 30-34 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). But see id at 17 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion). Justice Scalia's
argument is that sovereign immunity existed prior to the ratification of the Constitution
and that the Eleventh Amendment was intended to rectify a contrary inference by the
Supreme Court. Further, because the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified afterwards, it
necessarily places limits on the Eleventh Amendment. Justice Brennan notes, however,
that by the same logic, if sovereign immunity existed prior to the Constitution, then surely
Article I, which was ratified "afterwards," places limitations on it. Id.
42. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,517 (1997).
43. See id. at 536 (quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641,651 (1966)).
44. Kimel v. Florida, 120 S. Ct. 631,644 (2000) (citing City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518).
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Court has drastically constrained it. This is because the Court has
declared that Congress has no power to "decree the substance" of
constitutional rights or limitations. 45 This puts the Court in the tricky
position of determining whether a particular statute is "appropriate
prophylactic legislation" or whether it attempts to "[effect] a
substantive redefinition of the Fourteenth Amendment. '46 The test
the Court has formulated is whether there is "congruence and a
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and
the means adopted to that end." 47 In practical terms, this means, first,
that the Court will examine the congressional legislative history and
record regarding the statute to gauge whether Congress had sufficient
evidence of constitutional wrongs that it could then remedy or
prevent, the congruence part of the analysis; second, whether the
measure adopted was proportional to the evidence of the wrong.48 In
City of Boerne, the Court dismissed the evidence at issue as largely
"anecdotal" which did not reveal a "widespread pattern of
[constitutional wrongs] in this country. ' 49 Likewise, in the recent case
of Kimel v. Florida,the Court found that the evidence adduced by
Congress to support abrogation of state sovereign immunity from
enforcement of the Age Discrimination Enforcement Act ("ADEA")
was insufficient; Congress, despite scattered floor debates and
remarks to the contrary, never sufficiently identified evidence of
widespread constitutional wrongs.50 It is therefore not enough for
Congress to elucidate some reason for abrogation; it must come up
with a reason that is good enough. One could argue that the test for
abrogation is threefold: congruence, proportionality and sufficiency.
The problem with this abrogation test is that it is empirically difficult
to devise a standard for sufficiency. All we can know is that after the
College Savings cases and Kimel, the Supreme Court hasn't seen it
yet, and so Congress can't know what is or is not enough. Although it
is somewhat beyond the scope of this Note, it must be noted that this
form of Substantive Due Process is surprising, given that the Justices
who have led the charge, so to speak, are the same ones who have

45. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519.
46. Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 644 (citing City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519-20).
47. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520.
48. See idat 531-32; Kimel, 120 S.Ct. at 645.
49. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 531. City of Boerne involved a constitutional
challenge to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 ("RFRA"). See id
50. Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 648-50. Kimel involved the applicability of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act to the states. See id.
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decried similar constitutional "activism" in other contexts. 5' As we
shall see, the Court discounted similar amounts of evidence when it
arrived at its College Savings decisions.
One important exception to the Court's Eleventh Amendment
immunity jurisprudence is the Ex parte Young doctrine. 52 Under this
doctrine an individual can bring suit against a state officer in order to
53
ensure that the officer's conduct is in compliance with federal law.
Such a suit is generally limited to instances involving "prospective
injunctive relief" in order to end a "continuing violation of federal
law. ' 54 The Ex parte Young doctrine rests on the legal fiction that,
when acting contrary to federal law, state officers are not acting on
behalf of the state and are therefore not covered by sovereign
immunity. Although the language states that the holding is limited to
injunctive relief,55 in 1934 Congress passed the Federal Declaratory
Judgment Act which empowered the federal courts to grant
declaratory judgments under the Ex parte Young doctrine as a milder
56
alternative to the injunction remedy.
II. College Savings and the Crest of the Abrogation Doctrine
As mentioned above, the College Savings cases arose out of one
case in the District of New Jersey. College Savings Bank is a New
Jersey chartered bank that specializes in the financing of college
expenses though annuity contracts.57 College Savings obtained a
patent for its financing methodology, "designed to guarantee
investors sufficient funds to cover the costs of tuition for colleges. '58
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board ("Florida
Prepaid") is an entity that also administers tuition prepayment
contracts and is created by the State of Florida pursuant to a

51. For a criticism of the Rehnquist Court's approach to constitutional interpretation
in the context of its Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, see generally John Randolph
Prince, Forgetting the Lyrics and Changing the Tune: The Eleventh Amendment and

Textual Infidelity, 104 DICK. L. REV. 1 (1999).
52. See generally, Ex ParteYoung, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
53. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,71 n.14 (1996).
54. E.g., id. at 73 (quoting Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985)(emphasis
added)). For an extensive discussion of the availability of Ex parte Young injunctions
after Seminole Tribe, see generally Patricia L. Barsalou and Scott A. Stengel, Ex parte
Young: Relativity in Practice,72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 455 (1998).
55. See Young, 209 U.S. at 126.
56. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 466-67 (1973); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S.
82, 111-15 (1971).
57. See FloridaPrepaid,527 U.S. 627, 630 (1999).
58. Id. at 631.
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legislative statute. 59 College Savings contended that Florida Prepaid
had directly and indirectly infringed its patent and brought suit
against Florida Prepaid in the District of New Jersey. 6° College
Savings also contended that Florida Prepaid had violated the Lanham
Act "by making misstatements about its own tuition savings plans in
its brochures and annual reports."'61 Florida Prepaid moved to
dismiss the entire action on sovereign immunity grounds. 62 The
district court denied the motion to dismiss as to the patent claims but
granted the motion on the Lanham Act claims. 63 The patent case
went to the Federal Circuit which affirmed the lower court's
opinion. 64 The trademark case went to the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals, which also affirmed the lower court's decision. 65 Both cases
were then appealed to the Supreme Court and certiorari was granted
to both. It should be noted at the outset that, because of the
particular posture of this case, the literal language of the Eleventh
Amendment was met-a citizen of one state was trying to use the
judicial process of the federal system to hale another state into
federal court located in that state. Further, neither petitioner, the
respondent, nor the United States, which held the status of intervenor
ever since the district court level, 66 had argued that the central tenet
of Seminole Tribe was wrong; that Article I of the Constitution could
not be used to abrogate sovereign immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment. As Congress had enacted the laws explicitly to
abrogate state sovereign immunity, the only question for both cases
was whether Congress had done enough under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment.
A. Florida Prepaid, the Patent Case

By the 1980s the Federal Circuit, which has exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over patent cases, 67 held that the congressional patent
laws did not have the requisite statement of intent to abrogate state
59. See id.
60. See id. at 633.
61. See College Savings, 527 U.S. 666, 671 (1999).
62. See id.; FloridaPrepaid,527 U.S. at 633.
63. See College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,
948 F. Supp. 400,428 (D.N.J. 1996).
64. See College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,
148 F.3d 1343, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
65. See College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,
131 F.3d 353, 366 (3d Cir. 1997).
66. See College Savings, 527 U.S. 666, 671 (1999).
67. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (1994).
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sovereign immunity from patent infringement suits68 as was first
required by the Supreme Court in Atascadero State Hospital v.
Scanlon.69 In response, Congress passed the Patent Remedy Act in
order to "clarify that States, instrumentalities of States, and officers
and employees of States acting in their official capacity, are subject to
suit in Federal court by any person" for patent infringement.7 °
Various sections of the Act were changed so as to explicitly apply to
states and their employees, officers and instrumentalities, thus
meeting the "clear language" test of Atascadero.71 The Federal
Circuit examined the Act in light of Seminole Tribe and decided that
the PRA met the abrogation doctrine standard. 72 Specifically, it held
that the congruency requirement was met, since Congress was trying73
to prevent deprivation of property without due process of the law.
The Federal Circuit also held that the proportionality requirement
was met, since significant harm results from state infringement of
patents 74 and "there is no sound reason to hold that Congress cannot
subject a state to the same civil consequences that face a private party
infringer. 75 Sound reason or not, the Supreme Court would reverse
on this very ground.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, distilled the case
law summarized above76 down to a single issue. Since Seminole Tribe
required that Congress had to "identify conduct transgressing the
Fourteenth Amendment's substantive provisions, '77 and then had to
"tailor its legislative scheme to remedying or preventing such
conduct," 78 could the PRA be viewed as "remedial or preventive
protections of the Fourteenth
legislation aimed at securing the
79
Amendment for patent owners"?
The critical fact for the Court was that Congress, as in Seminole
Tribe and later in Kimel, had not pointed to a pattern of patent
68. See Chew v. California, 893 F.2d 331,334 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
69. 473 U.S. 234, 242-43 (1985).
70. Florida Prepaid,527 U.S. 627, 632 (1999) (quoting Pub. L. No. 102-560 preamble,
106 Stat. 4230).
71. See id.
72. See id. at 633.
73. See College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.
148 F. 3d 1343, 1349-50 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
74. See id. at 1353-54.
75. Id. at 1355.
76. See supra, Part I.
77. Florida Prepaid,527 U.S. 627,639 (1999).
78. Id.
79. Id.
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infringement by the states, "let alone a pattern of constitutional
violations." 80 Nor did Congress base its statute on deprivation of
procedural due process: that by depriving patent holders of an
adequate remedy by requiring that patent holders turn to state
mechanisms for enforcement, the holders were deprived of a
constitutional guarantee. 81 The only case Congress could make was
that state remedies might be non-uniform or uncertain, not that they
did not exist.82 Thus, because the legislation was neither congruent
nor proportional to a legitimate Fourteenth Amendment goal, the
Patent Remedy Act was unconstitutional, and the cause of action
83
dismissed.
B.

College Savings, the Trademark Case

The issue in College Savings was slightly different than that in
Florida Prepaid. Although the Court had to discuss the abrogation
doctrine above, it also had to deal with the doctrine of "constructive
waiver" of sovereign immunity. 84 Under this theory, Congress could
set up a statutory scheme such that if a state engaged in a course of
activity (e.g., owning patents) then it could expect to be sued in
federal court. 85 This had been called Pardenwaiver and seemed to be
a common sense remedy for when states chose to act in a field
occupied by federal law.86 In College Savings, the Court overturned
Parden, this time stating that any waiver of a constitutional right has
to be examined stringently and that, accordingly, constructive waiver
has no place in sovereign immunity jurisprudence. 87
College Savings argued that the TRCA was passed pursuant to
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as a valid exercise of
abrogation. Although the Court did not explicitly use the Seminole
Tribe factors, it seemed to find that the TRCA lacked the Seminole
Tribe congruency. According to the Court, the false advertising
provisions of the Lanham Act did not represent a right the

80. See id. at 640.

81. See id. at 643-44.
82. See id. at 644-45. This is especially interesting in light of the Court's decision in the
same Term which allowed states to deny the use of their judicial systems for the hearing of
federal causes of action, perhaps including Federal constitutional violations. See generally
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
83. See FloridaPrepaid,527 U.S. 627,630 (1999).
84. College Savings, 527 U.S. 666, 675 (1999).
85. See id. at 676-77.
86. See, e.g., Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
87. See College Savings, 527 U.S. at 680 (overruling Parden).
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Fourteenth Amendment was meant to protect. 88 The hallmark of a
property right, according to the Court, is the right to exclude. 89 False
advertising is not such a property right-there is "no decision of [the
Supreme] Court (or of any other court, for that matter) recognizing a
property right in freedom from a competitor's false advertising about
Additionally, the petitioner tried to base
its own products." 9
congressional authority on protecting a generalized right in the
security of "business interests." 91 The Court likewise disposed of this
argument- although the assets of a business are certainly "property,"
"business in the sense of the activity of doing business ... is not
property in the ordinary sense." 92 Since there was no deprivation of
property to bring the Act within the ambit of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court did not need to consider the follow-up
question of whether the legislation was genuinely necessary (the
proportionality prong).93
I.

Reassessing Eleventh Amendment Standards

One approach to the problem of Eleventh Amendment
immunity blocking suits against states for intellectual property
infringement, is to reassess the requirements for invoking the
Eleventh Amendment. The Eleventh Amendment was written to
protect state sovereignty, not to provide cover for unjust acts. By
focusing on this aspect of the Eleventh Amendment, instead of
applying a rote application of money-focused "principles," better,
more just, outcomes may follow.
As outlined above, the focus in Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence has historically been on the treasury: to what extent
will the State Treasury be required to pay for the torts of the entity in
question? In Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp.94 the
Supreme Court dealt with a tort action brought against a bistate
compact.95 The Court, after reviewing the sparse case law regarding
the interaction of the Eleventh Amendment with bistate compacts,
decided that the Port Authority was not cloaked by the Eleventh

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

See hiL
at 672.
See id. at 673.
Id.
See id at 672.
Id. at 675.
See id.
513 U.S. 30 (1994).
See i&. at 32.
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Amendment. 96 This decision was based on the primacy the treasury
factor held in the test for Eleventh Amendment immunity. 97 Since
the payments of liabilities for torts committed by the entity would not
come from the states' treasuries- "the Port Authority is financially
self-sufficient; it generates its own revenues, and it pays its own
debts"-the Eleventh Amendment would not be implicated. 9s
In dissent, Justice O'Connor 99 argued that the language of the
Eleventh Amendment suggested a different test, or, at least, one that
did not give primacy to the treasury factor. 1° O'Connor reasoned
that the text of the Eleventh Amendment referred to immunity for
suits in "law or equity" and that, therefore, whether a state's treasury
might be liable was perhaps a sufficient, but not a necessary, factor for
determining sovereign immunity.101
Rather, Justice O'Connor
suggested that the proper inquiry was whether the "State possesses
sufficient control over an entity performing government functions
that the entity may properly be called an extension of the State
itself.1102 The talisman for this test would be whether the entity in
question "is an entity that undertakes state functions and is politically
accountable to the State, and by extension, to the electorate." 103 "If
the lines of oversight are clean and substantial-for example, if the
State appoints and removes an entity's governing personnel and
retains veto or approval power over an entity's undertakings-then
the entity should be deemed an arm of the State for Eleventh
Amendment purposes." 1 4 O'Connor's test, then, focuses on the
extent to which a state entity is an actual extension of state
sovereignty, rather than an extension of the state treasury. Such an
approach would require more of a case-by-case inquiry, since
different actions of the same state entity are under the control of a
state to differing degrees, but such an inquiry is bound to lead to
more just outcomes.
In a public university situation (again, the area where intellectual
property and Eleventh Amendment issues are most likely to collide),
96. See id. at 47-51.
97. See id. at 48-49 (listing cases).
98. Id. at 52.
99. The author would like to note that he and Justice O'Connor have no known direct
familial relationship.
100. See id. at 58 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor was joined in her
opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas.
101. See id. at 59-60 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 61 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
103. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
104. Id. (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
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states rarely exercise direct supervisory control. Under a controlbased inquiry, public universities have a fair degree of autonomyRegents cannot be removed at the whim of a governor, but usually
serve set terms; policies are generally settled on far from direct
government supervision; and, more importantly for our purposes,
intellectual property use decisions are made even farther from any
government interference. Thus, under such a test, a suit against a
state entity for patent infringement would not implicate Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity, and a suit for damages would go
forward. 105 Such a holding would, admittedly, fly in the face of longstanding jurisprudence regarding the application of the Eleventh
Amendment, but such a test would provide security for other
participants in federally protected systems, and would result in fair
and equitable results. 106
IV. Litigation Alternatives After College Savings
The question now becomes: What can a patent or trademark
holder do to protect their intellectual property rights from
interference by state entities after the College Savings cases but
before Congress develops a statutory alternative? Initially, it should
be pointed out that the main consequence of Eleventh Amendment
immunity is to foreclose suit against the several states in federal
courts. However, after Alden v. Maine, a state cannot be forced to
hear cases against it based on an exclusively federal cause of action. 0 7
Since federal infringement actions against a state entity cannot be
brought in federal courts, and state courts do not have to hear them, a
private holder of intellectual property must consider other
alternatives. This section, however, begins with a broad overview of
the statutory remedies for the average patent or trademark action.
The patent laws are codified in Title 35 of the United States
105. The author does not pretend that O'Connor's test in Hess was intended to be as
hostile to sovereignty as this Note suggests; indeed, the particular application of a control
test could result in a more expansive availability of state sovereignty as a defense. This
Note does suggest that the line should be drawn in a far different place than the Hess
dissenters would likely have it, allowing for a more equitable appraisal of the extent to
which actual sovereignty is implicated in a particular lawsuit.
106. "[T]he control test goes further than the Court's single factor in assuring state
governments the critical flexibility in internal governance that is essential to sovereign
authority." Id. at 62. Note that the dissent casts the control test as more deferential than a
treasury-based test. This, as should have been demonstrated, is not always the case.
107. 527 U.S. 706, 711 (1999). "We hold that the powers delegated to Congress under
Article I of the Constitution do not include the power to subject nonconsenting States to
private suits for damages in state courts." Id.
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Code. 108 Remedies are available for direct, 10 9 induced, 110 and
contributory"' infringement of a patent. Damages and injunctive
relief are both available whether the infringement was intentional or
accidental.112 Willful infringement of a patent can result in enhanced
damages up to treble damages, but good faith compliance is a
mitigating factor in the awarding of these damages. 113 Regular
damages are awarded on the basis of reasonable royalties1n 4 and/or
115

lost profits.
Federal trademark law dates back to the passage of the Lanham
Act in 1946. As in patent law, liability for use of a trademark attaches
whether or not infringement was intentional. 1 6 Damages available
for infringement of a trademark include: 1) defendant's profits, 2)
plaintiffs damages and 3) costs of the action, 117 although these can be
limited by the culpability of the defendant." 8 The importance of
examining these statutory provisions is that the federal patent and
trademark protections incorporate the policy of strict liability (i.e.,
liability for unintentional infringement) to an extent that the
constitutional provisions we are about to look at do not. Any
recourse to a constitutional remedy is, therefore, likely to be a step
down.
A. A Takings Cause of Action
In Florida Prepaid, Chief Justice Rehnquist suggested that a
takings cause of action under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments

may be available. 1 9 We will start our inquiry here.

The main

108. See generally 35 U.S.C. (1994).
109. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1994).
110. See id. § 271(b).
111. See id. § 271(c).
112. See, e.g., id §§ 284,286; Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co. 56 F.3d 1538, 1574 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (en banc); Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Panduit
Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1158 (6th Cir. 1978).
113. See 35 U.S.C. § 284; Read Corp. 970 F.2d at 826-27 (examining factors to be
considered in the awarding of enhanced damages).
114. See, e.g., Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116,
1118 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
115. See, e.g., Rite-Hite Corp., 56 F.2d at 1539.
116. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114, 1116 (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
117. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (1994).
118. See, e.g., Seatrax, Inc. v. Sonbeck Int'l Inc., 200 F.3d 358, 369 (5th Cir. 2000)
(holding that when determining if a plaintiff is entitled to an accounting of defendant's
profits, the decision is affected by various factors, including "whether the defendant
intended to confuse or deceive").
119. 527 U.S. 627, 644 n.9 (1999) (citing Jacobs Wind Elec. Co. v. Florida Dept. of
Transp., 626 So. 2d 1333 (Fla. 1993)).
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questions are: first, whether a patent or trademark represents a
property interest protected by the Takings Clause; second, what
activities constitute a taking; third, what remedies are available for a
takings; and, fourth, what procedural difficulties will a patent or
trademark holder encounter in trying to protect their intellectual
property?
(1) Is a Patentor TrademarkActually Property?
120
The leading case on this point is Ruckelhaus v. Monsanto Co.,

where the Supreme Court dealt with the issue of whether the giving
up of trade secrets to a federal government agency constituted a
taking under the Constitution. 12' In dealing with trade secrets, the
Court addressed the question of whether "commercial data"
implicated the Takings Clause. 122 The Court said it was important to
note

that,

"[piroperty

interests ...

are not

created

by the

Constitution. Rather they are created and their dimensions are
defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an
independent source such as state law."' 23 The trade secret holder,
Missouri-based Monsanto, argued that its intellectual property
constituted property because it was protected under Missouri law and
the Restatement of Torts. 24 The Court observed that the value of a
trade secret as property depended on "the extent to which the owner
15
of the secret protects his interest from disclosure to others."'
Additional factors that were important to the Court included the fact
can form
that trade secrets can be assignable, and that a "trade secret
126
the res of a trust, and it passes to a trustee in bankruptcy."'
Likewise, the value of a patent derives from the ability of a
patent holder to exclude others from its use. The patent is a limited
grant of a monopoly to an inventor in exchange for the publication of
the patent and for the eventual relinquishment of the exclusive right
to use the patent after the expiration of a term of years. 127 A
trademark's value also derives from the trademark's holder's ability
to exclude others from using, not just that particular trademark, but
120. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
121. See id. at 1000-01.
122. See id at 1001.
123. Id (quoting Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161
(1980)) (internal citations omitted).

124. See id. at 1001.
125. Id. at 1002.
126. Id. (citation omitted).

127. See DONALD S.

CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 16.04

(2000).
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also similar trademarks that might interfere with the trademark's
"distinctiveness."
There is a conceptual problem, however, in
cognizing intellectual property rights as similar to other property
rights in the Eleventh Amendment context; a patent derives its value
exclusively from the same federal law that can't be enforced against
the state. In fact, at common law, an inventor, although having the
right to make, use, and sell an invention, did not have the right to
exclude others.128 Still, based on the rational investment-backed
expectation test of takings, discussed further below, it would be a feat
of academic sophistry to deny that patents and trademarks would
have no value for purpose of a takings cause of action brought against
the state.
(2) What Activities Constitute a Taking?
The jurisprudence of government takings tends to divide the
causes of action into per se takings and regulatory takings. Per se
takings are takings of physical property that constitute a taking
without further analysis. Historically, this category was limited to
"total" takings of physical property by the government. The classic
example of a per se taking is Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CA TV Corp,129 ("Loretto"). In Loretto the Supreme Court ruled that
an actual physical invasion, no matter how slight or small, constitutes
a compensable taking. 130 Understandably, then, a plaintiff in a
takings suit wants to cast the government interference at issue as a per
se taking.
Regulatory takings, on the other hand, involve a governmental
regulation that collaterally deprives property of value or some other
essential "stick" from the "bundle" of property rights. Whether a
regulation or other government action triggers a finding of a
regulatory taking is a difficult one:
While [the Supreme Court] has recognized that the Fifth
Amendment's guarantee... [is] designed to bar Government from
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole, [the
Supreme Court] quite simply, has been unable to develop any 'set
128. See Lariscey v. United States, 949 F.2d 1137, 1142 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (vacated, 962
F.2d 1047 (Fed. Cir. 1992), and affirmed by an equally divided en bane panel of the
Federal Circuit, 981 F.2d 1244 (Fed. Cir. 1992)) (citing Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool
& Mach. Works, 261 U.S. 24,35-36 (1923)).
129. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
130. See id. at 427. "When faced with a constitutional challenge to a permanent
physical occupation of real property, this Court has invariably found a taking." Id.
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formula' for determining when 'justice and fairness' require that

economic injuries
caused by public action be compensated by the
131
government.

Any inquiry into such a taking is therefore admittedly "ad hoc" and
depends on the circumstances of each case. 132
(a) The Case for Per Se Takings
The basis for the value of a patent is the grant of a monopoly in
the patent. Indeed, as Justice Scalia stated in College Savings, the
right to exclude is the most central "stick" in the bundle of property
rights. 133 A use of a valid patent by a governmental entity directly
interferes with this monopoly right. Certainly, it is not a physical
taking in the sense of Loretto; the state doesn't come to the inventor's
house and take the patent certificate (or the invention for that
matter). However, a state entity's use violates the monopoly right,
and as such is a direct interference in the very right that gives rise to
the value. As such, a use of intellectual property by the state could be
a per se taking, and, if so, compensable.
(b) The Case for a Regulatory Taking
Sometimes a government regulation will not result in the
physical expropriation of the property, but will have such a serious
impact on some aspect of the property that the courts will find a
"regulatory taking." Whether a regulation or government action is
serious enough to fall into this category is very difficult to predict. At
times the Court has applied what some observers have called
"conceptual severance." 13 In a conceptual severance analysis, the
government will take some central property right, thus triggering the
protection of the Takings Clause. An example of this theory in action
135
is the Supreme Court's holding in Hodel v. Irving.
In Hodel, the Court considered whether a regulation of Indian
inheritance brought about a "taking" of a decedent's property. 36 The
131. Penn Cent. Transp. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-24 (1978) (internal
citations omitted).
132. See id.
133. See College Savings, 527 U.S. 666,673 (1999).
134. As coined by Professor Margaret Radin, this "consists of delineating a property
interest consisting of just what the government action has removed from the owner, and
then asserting that that particular whole thing has been permanently taken." Margaret
Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudenceof
Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1667,1675 (1988).
135. 481 U.S. 704 (1987).
136. Id. at 706.
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statute in question was passed to deal with the problem of
"fractionalization" of Indian lands through inheritance which had
resulted in absurd situations, including the ownership of 40 acres by
as many as 439 owners. 137 The solution to this problem was to
completely destroy interests in land that were worth "2 per centum or
less of the total acreage.., and has earned to its owner less than $100
in the preceding year."'1 38 Congress had made no provisions for
compensation or exception. 139 The Court laid out several factors to
consider in determining whether there was a regulatory taking,
including "the economic impact of the regulation, its interference
with reasonable investment backed expectations, and the character of
the government action." 140 On the economic impact factor, the Court
conceded that such impact was limited; it further noted that any
contention that investment backed expectations were implicated was
"dubious. ' 141 The Court stated that the character of the government
action was "extraordinary" because of the abrogation of the right to
pass on property, a "part of the Anglo-American legal system since
feudal times." 142 Since the destruction of property interests was
"total," the taking without compensation could not be upheld. 43
Hodel is instructive in how to set up a taking cause of action for
interference of intellectual property.
First, as to conceptual severance, the government action is an
interference with the right to exclude, which the Court has repeatedly
stated is "one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that
are commonly characterized as property."'144 At face value,
conceptual severance might allow one to argue that the state entity
has "taken" the patent or trademark by interfering with the right to
exclude. One problem with this argument is that the state is not
entirely destroying that property right. Rather, because of the state's
sovereign immunity, the intellectual property owner has merely lost
the ability to exclude the state; the appropriation is not "total." The
owner may still enjoin others who try to use his or her patent,
trademark or copyright. 145
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

See iL at 712-13.
Id. at 709 (quoting 96 Stat. 2519, 25 U.S.C. § 2206 (1994)).
See id.
See id. at 714 (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979).
See id. at 714-16.
Id. at 716.

143. See id.
144. Id. (quoting KaiserAetna, 444 U.S. at 176).
145. Complications can certainly arise when state entities license their possibly
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The economic impact of the state action may bear more fruit for
a takings cause of action here. This will depend, however, on the
particular factual scenario. Take as an example a trademark
infringer. Certainly, if the Hastings Law Journal146 were to rename
itself the San Francisco Chronicle, the economic impact would be
absolute; the Chronicle would lose any and all licensing fees it would
otherwise be entitled to. Perhaps more importantly, the Chronicle
loses control over its trademark; the loss of that control certainly is
total. However, if the Journal were to rename itself the Hastings
Chronicles, (or just The Chronicle of Hastings in San Francisco) the

impact would be more attenuated, and the resultant taking cause of
action more difficult to prove.
More promising than either the economic nature or the
conceptual severance arguments is the argument that an
appropriation of intellectual property is an interference with
"reasonable investment-backed expectations." Intellectual property
holders have had the expectation that their property rights will not be
infringed-that is the whole purpose for going through the process of
registering trademarks and obtaining patents. Since part of the value
of the intellectual property is protection from infringing activity, it
would seem that this factor would weigh heavily in favor of a takings
cause of action. 147
(3) What Remedies are Available for a Taking of Intellectual Property?

The most important aspect of patent rights concerning the ability
to exclude is the availability of injunctive relief. Under current
takings jurisprudence, injunctions are not available. Nor is the
generally available (and desirable) remedy of treble damages for
willful infringement. With some judicial tinkering, however, more
expansive remedies may be available than one might first suppose.
infringing intellectual property to non-state entities. Whether sovereign immunity would
protect a licensee of possibly infringing intellectual property is beyond the scope of this
Note. However, if it could be shown that such licensing completely destroyed the market
for the intellectual property holder, an effective taking of the right to exclude could then
be shown.
146. This illustration presumes that the Journal, as an arm of a state entity-the
University of California, Hastings College of the Law-is entitled to sovereign immunity
protection from the federal trademark laws.
147. See, e.g., Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 528 (1998) (O'Connor, J. for a

four-Justice plurality) (finding that a regulation consisted of a taking mostly on the basis of
the investment-backed expectations prong), but see id. at 554 (Breyer, J., dissenting and
writing for four Justices); Id. at 540-41 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and
dissenting in part) (finding no taking had occurred).
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(a) Injunctions
It has been well-settled that injunctions for takings are generally
unavailable.148 The only time equitable relief is even remotely
available is when a suit for compensation cannot be brought against
the sovereign subsequent to the taking.1 49 This renders the state
action unconstitutional and, therefore, enjoinable. The reason this
rarely comes into play is that most takings are one-time occurrences;
the taking would have to be both on-going and non-compensable,
either because of a lack of funds or because no compensation method
exists. In states without tort claims acts or expropriation acts that
cover the patent situation, an injunction may just be available on the
theory that uses of patents are rarely one time occurrences, but
usually entail continual use.
The only other possibility of obtaining an injunction might be if
the taking was not for a "public use." "The 'public use' requirement
is... coterminous with the scope of a sovereign's police powers."' 150
The Supreme Court has found that "[s]o long as the taking has a
conceivable public character, the means by which it will be
attained.., is for Congress to determine. 15 1 The issue of whether
government activity would count as a public use is therefore thought
to be a dead letter. However, in light of the issues this Note raises,
the public use component of the analysis needs to be revisited.
The Supreme Court's language in examining the public use
requirement has generally been couched in language of judicial
deference to legislative findings. 52 But usually it is not the
legislatures who hold the intellectual property; it is some
administrative body far removed from the legislature. As a result, the
rationale for deference to the government actor simply is not present.
Certainly, in a given factual situation, an infringing use can serve the
public interest. It is arguable, for example, that the College Savings
activities of using business methodologies for college loans is a public
use. On the other hand, the author defies anyone to devise a public
use argument for changing the Hastings Law Journal's name to the
San Francisco Chronicle. Somewhere between those two examples is
where the public use deference breaks down. Where the state entity

148. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986,1016 (1984).
149. See id. at 1016-17. Cf Eastern Enterprises,524 U.S. at 520 (O'Connor, J., plurality
opinion) (discussing availability of injunctive relief for takings against the federal courts).
150. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1014 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
151. Id. (internal citation omitted).
152. See id. at 1015-16.

July 2000]

COLLEGE SAVINGS CASES

1025

acts, not by legislative determination, but by independent action, the
public use deference should dissolve, and a higher standard should
apply. Under current law, however, it is difficult to see how an
intellectual property holder can argue for an injunction on this basis.
(b) Damages remedies
Under patent laws, treble damages are available for willful
infringement of patents; 153 this is what makes the patent laws so useful
a tool for the prevention of infringement in the first place. It is
generally assumed that enhanced damages are unavailable for
constitutional takings. 54 Indeed, it is intrinsic to the very nature of
takings jurisprudence that they are willful on the part of the state; the
Supreme Court has specifically found that negligent or accidental
taking of property does not constitute a compensable taking. 55
Therefore, it seems unlikely that anything beyond purely
compensatory damages will be available.
(4) Ripeness and Takings Cause ofAction

An intellectual property owner who suspects that a government
entity has used or misappropriated his or her property cannot simply
run into the nearest Federal Court and immediately file a cause of
action for a taking. The Supreme Court has placed relatively minor,
yet important, hurdles to clear before resorting to federal court.
Namely, the "plaintiff cannot bring a takings claim in federal district
court, whether for injunctive relief or damages, until the plaintiff has
sought and been denied just compensation.' 1 56 This is simply a
ripeness issue; "until a plaintiff has sought just compensation, there is
no case or controversy.' 1 57 In Williamson County Regional Planning
Commission v. Hamilton Bank, the Supreme Court dismissed a case

because the plaintiff had moved to federal court before a zoning
commission had conclusively ruled on an ordinance. 58 The Court
took care to note that the plaintiff need not pursue every state remedy
available, but must proceed from some final determination. 5 9 The
153. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994).
154. See, e.g., Clark v. Library of Congress, 750 F.2d 89,104 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
155. See, e.g., Parrat v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
156. Unix Sys. Labs. v. Berkeley Software Design, Inc., 832 F. Supp. 790, 806 (D.N.J.
1993) (citing Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172,
194 (1985)).
157. Id.
158. 473 U.S. at 186.
159. See id at 192-93.

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 51

lesson for intellectual property holders seeking to protect their
patents or trademarks is that they must first use whatever
administrative or judicial avenues are placed before them under their
160
state's laws.
B. Declaratory Relief

Another way to bring an action for intellectual property
infringement in Federal Court, aside from a takings cause of action, is
to sue for declaratory relief. Certainly, declaratory judgements do
not, in themselves, support any damages or the possibility of
injunctive relief.161 However, there would be some advantages for

such a cause of action. First, federal courts will have exclusive
jurisdiction. Second, Eleventh Amendment considerations may not
even come into play here-as outlined above, the current over-riding
consideration is what impact the litigation will have on the state's
treasury. 162 An action for declaratory relief does not, by definition,
involve any claim on the state's treasury.

One district court has

already held that Eleventh Amendment immunity does not extend to
declaratory relief, although that holding was based more on principles
of fairness. 63 Another advantage is simple familiarity with the
subject matter. Federal Courts have the procedures and federal
judges the expertise and experience in dealing with patent and

trademark litigation. They are familiar with the intricacies of the
patent process. One district court even has special procedural rules
for dealing with litigation involving patents. 164
Finally, declaratory judgments allow a plaintiff to take control of
160. In his piece, Glauberman discusses the takings cause of action briefly. See
Glauberman, supra note 10, at 96-100. Glauberman misconstrues the differences between
governmental interferences with property sounding in tort and those sounding in the
takings clause. Glauberman believes the difference is whether the action was authorized
or not. The question is not whether it is "authorized" but whether it is intentional.
Unintentional interferences with property rights simply do not implicate the takings
clause. See, e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986) (overruling Parrat v.
Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981) and holding that "mere lack of due care by a state official" is
not enough to create a cause of action for deprivation of life, liberty or property under the
Fourteenth Amendment).
161. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201.
162. See, e.g., Unix Sys. Labs. v. Berkeley Software Design, Inc., 832 F. Supp. 790, 798
(D.N.J. 1993).
163. See New Star Lasers, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 63 F. Supp. 2d 1240, 1244
(E.D. Cal. 1999); but see Jacobs Wind Elec. Co. v. Florida Dep't. of Transp., 919 F.2d 726,
728 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (rejecting inapplicability of Eleventh Amendment to declaratory
judgment actions).
164. See N.D. Cal. Civ L.R. 16-7 to 16-11.
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litigation.
Declaratory judgments-for example, a declaratory
judgment that a trademark or patent is valid-may actually force the
state entities to bring forward their counterclaims in federal court.
Federal Rule of Procedure 13 requires the bringing of all counter
claims "arising out of the same transaction.' '165 Courts have held that
a failure to do this will result in foreclosure of those causes of action
under principles of res judicata.166 However, the preclusive effects of
declaratory judgments remain uncertain, so the practitioner should
proceed with caution.
One problem with declaratory judgment is that it requires a
particular factual situation to satisfy the requirements of the Article
III "case or controversy" provision-there must be some expectation
of being sued by a state for infringement. Research by the author has
turned up no reported case involving a declaratory judgment by a
prospective plaintiff in the intellectual property setting; declaratory
judgments are usually defensive measures to forestall or take the
initiative on threatened litigation. Additionally, the lack of Eleventh
Amendment immunity to declaratory judgment actions is not a
completely settled issue, so such an action may be risky. Finally,
declaratory relief is not favored by federal courts; federal judges have
great discretion to dismiss such actions if they could have been
brought in other courts, even state courts.
C.

Procedural Due Process Claim
One other litigation strategy is suggested by the Supreme Court's
decision in Williamson County. Rather than alleging a taking of
property, the intellectual property holder could allege that the state
action "goes so far that it has the same effect as a taking by eminent
domain [and that therefore it is] violative of the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment."' 167 A due process claim may even be
more appealing than a takings claim, since the remedy for such action
is "not 'just compensation,' but invalidation of the [state action], and
if authorized and appropriate, actual damages.' 1 68 Such an action
requires the lack of an adequate compensation mechanism. The
primary advantage for the intellectual property holder is the

165.
166.
1981).
167.
(1985).
168.

FED. R. CIV. P. 13.
See, e.g., Nash County Bd. of Educ. v. Biltmore Co., 640 F.2d 484, 488 (4th Cir.
Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 197
Id.
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availability of injunctive relief for due process violations pursuant to
Ex parte Young. The drawback to such an action is that there is a
similar "exhaustion" requirement for due process violations-there
has to be an attempt to get the state to comply with due process. 169
The Supreme Court has also implied that it is hostile to such a due
process argument, if only because determining when a regulation or
70
state action goes "too far" is exceedingly difficult.
Additionally, such a cause of action would be brought under
§ 1983, a federal statute authorizing suits against state actors in
federal courts for "deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws."'171 Section 1983 allows suits
against individuals who act under "color of state law."' 72 Although
enhanced, or punitive, damages are allowed for suits brought under
§ 1983, they are only allowed when "the defendant's conduct is shown
to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless
'73
or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.'
Moreover, the exact level of intent required to trigger § 1983
availability is open to question, but it is clear that for a state actor to
be liable, something more than mere negligence (indeed, something
more than "deliberate indifference") is required. 7 4 Finally, certain
state officials might be liable for actions they take in an official
capacity. 175 The doctrine of qualified immunity requires a factintensive determination the parameters of which are beyond the
scope of this Note.
Ultimately, the litigation alternatives open to an intellectual
property holder, whether a takings cause of action, a declaratory
judgment action, or a proceeding under § 1983 are not as direct or as
effective as the actions that arise under the federal intellectual
property statutes. Furthermore, the alternatives that are available are
extremely complex and depend on the availability of compensation
mechanisms in each state, creating fifty different enforcement levels
169. See, e.g., id. at 199-200.
170. See id. at 200 n.17. "The attempt to determine when regulation goes so far that it
becomes, literally or figuratively, a 'taking' [in the sense that takings and due process
violations become conflated] has been called the 'lawyer's equivalent of the physicist's
hunt for the quark."' Id. (citation omitted).
171. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
172. See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (overruled on other grounds by
Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)).
173. Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 536 (1999) (quoting Smith v.
Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983)).
174. See, e.g., County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998).
175. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
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where there used to be one. This Note next looks at alternatives
Congress could consider to make the full panoply of the intellectual
property statutes available to combat potential state infringement of
intellectual property rights.
V. Legislative Alternatives
In the long term, Congress should provide some remedy for the
interference of intellectual property rights by states despite the
Court's holding in the College Savings cases. The main options are: to
try again to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity pursuant to the
14th Amendment; to condition certain money grants to the states on
waiver of state sovereignty; to abrogate a state's sovereign immunity
pursuant to the Treaty Power; or to engage in what this Note calls the
"quid pro quo" approach, which should be available only for the
various intellectual property statutes.
A. Proceeding Under the Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment
As the cases make clear, congressional abrogation of the states'
sovereign immunity is extremely difficult and of limited utility. As
outlined above, the Supreme Court has limited abrogation specifically
to those activities that contravene the Fourteenth Amendment and
that are remedial in nature. 176 As we have seen, the Court has
formulated a broad substantive component to its inquiry regarding
this area of Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence. 177 Congress must
therefore demonstrate extensive examples of state infringement of
Additionally, it seems that
private intellectual property. 17 8
congressional action is limited somewhat to those remedies already
granted under the Fourteenth Amendment. 79 Although the Court
arguably has retreated from this position, 180 it still seems that, in
Section 5 jurisprudence, remedial compensation is favored over

176. See, e.g., FloridaPrepaid,527 U.S. 627,636-40 (1999).
177. See id.

178. See id at 640 (noting scant evidence of state infringement of patent rights).
179. See id. at 646 ("Congress did nothing to limit the coverage of the Act to cases
involving arguable constitutional violations.").
180. See Kimel, 120 S. Ct. 631, 644 (2000) ("Congress' § 5 power is not confined to the
enactment of legislation that merely parrots the precise wording of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Rather, Congress' power 'to enforce' the Amendment includes the
authority both to remedy and to deter violation of rights guaranteed thereunder by
prohibiting a somewhat broader swath of conduct, including that which is not itself
forbidden by the Amendment's text.")
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prospective relief' 81 Certain aspects of the patent, trademark and
copyright protection are also not covered by the Fourteenth
Amendments. 182 This is particularly true of the Lanham Act false
advertising provisions. 183 It is difficult to see how the current Court
could accept abrogation for false advertising purposes. It should also
be kept in mind that the Rehnquist Court has so far failed to uphold
any abrogation that has come before it, so non-section 5 abrogation
options should be considered.
B. Proceeding Under the Spending Power

The Constitution empowers Congress "to pay the Debts and
provide for the common Defense and general Welfare of the United
States."' 84 Congress has wielded great power through this clause. 185
Congress may attach conditions on receipt of such funds "to further
broad policy objectives... [to ensure] compliance by the recipient
186
with federal statutory and administrative directives.
This power has some limitations. First, the power must be used
for "the general welfare."' 87 Second, whatever conditions are
attached must be expressed "unambiguously... enabl[ing] the States
to exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of
their participation.' 88 Third, the conditions must be related "to the
federal interest in particular national projects or programs."' 189
Finally, other constitutional provisions may provide a bar to certain
types of conditions. 19° This bar works only against Congress attaching
conditions that would themselves be unconstitutional.' 91 A waiver of
sovereign immunity is not, in itself, unconstitutional.
Congress could condition waiver of sovereign immunity on
receipt of federal funds. It would have to satisfy the factors laid out
181. See id. at 647 (finding the sovereign immunity abrogation provisions of the ADEA
unjustified by remedial constitutional considerations).
182. See Florida Prepaid,527 U.S. 627, 644-47 (1999); College Savings, 527 U.S. 666,
671-75 (1999).
183. See College Savings,527 U.S. at 670-72.
184. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
1.
185. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206-07 (1987) (listing cases).
186. Id. (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980) (opinion of Burger,

C.J.)).
187. See id at 207 (citing Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640-41 (1937) and noting
deference to the judgment of Congress).
188. Id.(quoting Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1,17 (1981)).
189. Id. at 207-08 (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978)
(plurality opinion)).
190. See id. at 208.
191. See id. at 210.
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above. First, the requirement that the legislation provides for the
general welfare may be satisfied if Congress acts pursuant to the
Patent Clause. Certainly, in its Spending Clause jurisprudence, the
Court has been remarkably deferential to congressional
determinations of what is in the general welfare. 192 It remains to be
seen, however, whether the Court will apply the more onerous
substantive requirements of College Savings .to spending power
abrogations of sovereign immunity. Second, Congress must make the
condition "unambiguous." This is a matter of drafting that will
depend on the particular legislation that is passed. Third, the
condition would have to be related to the underlying legislation. For
example, a condition that a state waive sovereign immunity to allow
suits against its educational and research institutions could arguably
be placed on higher education funding, but such a condition would
not address an infringing action by a state-run financial institution. If
Congress wanted to completely abrogate sovereign immunity for all
intellectual property rights, it would have to undertake a herculean
series of legislative enactments which would be extremely inefficient.
Additionally, voluntary waiver of sovereign immunity simply does not
implicate the constitutional bar; any state may do it without running
afoul of the Constitution. 193 The final factor-that the condition not
be coercive-again depends on what the sort of spending the
condition is attached to; it is unlikely that Congress would be able to
attach intellectual property or sovereign immunity waiver conditions
to the acceptance of disaster relief funds, for example. 194 It should be
noted that the Court states, in dicta, "the point of coercion is
automatically reached-and the voluntariness of waiver destroyedwhen what is attached to the refusal to waive is the exclusion of the
195
State from otherwise lawful activity."'
C.

Proceeding Under the Treaty Power

Another avenue to consider is whether Congress could enact
192- See id. at 207 & n.2 (Rehnquist, C.J.,) (noting that the level of deference to
Congress is such that it could be questioned whether the "general welfare" limitation
exists any more).
193. See College Savings, 527 U.S. 666, 686-87 (1999) (distinguishing abrogation under
the Commerce Clause from conditional Spending Clause power).
194. Glauberman and Wiliamson both recommend using the conditional spending
power as one way to abrogate sovereign immunity. See Glauberman, supra note 10, at
106-09; Williamson, supra note 10, at 1759-60. Neither noted the possible failings of such a
system, i.e., that many different spending bills would have to have these conditions
attached in order to satisfy the relationship test.
195. College Savings, 527 U.S. at 687.
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legislation pursuant to the Treaty Power. This Section first asserts
that the College Savings and Alden cases have left the United States
in violation of several international treaty obligations, specifically the
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property agreement and the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. This Section then notes
how these violations leave the United States open to GATTsanctioned retaliation and, in a worse-case scenario, an outright trade
war. The Section then turns to whether, in order to bring the
intellectual property system in line with these obligations and to avoid
the retaliations, Congress could abrogate state sovereign immunity.
In order to answer this question, this Section will also present the
uncertain position agreements such as TRIPS and GATT have in
constitutional jurisprudence.
(1) The InternationalLandscape

The United States is a party to several agreements under which it
has incurred obligations to protect intellectual property at a certain
level and in a certain way that are affected by the Supreme Court's
sovereign immunity jurisprudence. For example, the Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property agreement ("TRIPS agreement")
mandates a particular method for securing the respect of intellectual
property rights from government entities. 196 Article 31 of the TRIPS
agreement provides for a series of restrictions and rules for "other
uses" of patents, 197 which includes specifically "use by the government
or third parties authorized by the government.' 198 One provision
states that an "other use" may only be permitted if "the proposed
user has made efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder on
reasonable commercial terms and that such efforts have not been
successful within a reasonable period of time."'199 Note that this
provision places the burden on the governmental 2°° user to seek
196. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Uraguay Round Agreements, April
15, 1994, Annex 1C, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, art. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereafter TRIPS].
197. "Other use" is defined as "other than that allowed in Article 30." See id. at art. 31
n.7. Article 30 allows for "limited exceptions" to exclusive patent rights "provided that
such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and
do not reasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account of
the legitimate interests of third parties." d. at art. 30.
198. Id. at art. 31. Note that a public university is either an arm of the government per
se, or is authorized by the government to hold intellectual property rights.
199. Id. at art. 31(b).
200. Whether a state is liable for these provisions, as much as the United States
government is, is itself a tricky question and is beyond the scope of this Note. For the
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reasonable terms, rather than on the intellectual property holder to
seek redress post facto. Other provisions of Article 30 require that a
government's use of a patent be limited to a specific purpose, and be
both non-assignable by, and non-exclusive to, the government in
question. 201 The College Savings cases, by removing the protection
against infringement of the patent laws by states in federal courts
(and the subsequent Alden ruling that state courts could not be forced
to hear federal causes of action brought against the states), run
directly afoul of these provisions. As detailed above, the litigation
alternatives keep the burden on the individual intellectual property
right holder to obtain the protection, rather than on the state to
provide the compensation. Furthermore, these cases have left
intellectual property to the whims of the state and whether they will
waive sovereign immunity.
The remedy for a violation of these provisions is provided for in
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"), to which
the TRIPS agreement is an annex. According to Article XXIII of
GATT, any member state believing that a benefit "accruing to it
directly or indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or
impaired" may petition the GATT"for a redress of grievances. 202 If,
after an investigative and appeal process has been completed, the
activity is found to be a nullification or impairment of a GATT'
benefit, the impaired party may be authorized to suspend its
concessions. 20 3 A concession is a reduction in tariffs negotiated on a
particular good. Thus, for failing to protect intellectual property in
line with the TRIPS agreement, the United States could be open to a
trade war on goods that have little or no relation to intellectual
property.
Further, even though the TRIPS agreement literally applies to
intentional government infringement of patents, GAT]T constraints
could be construed to apply to the lack of a remedy for unintentional
infringements and infringements, intentional or not, of other
intellectual property rights. Article XXIII of GATT provides that a
nullification or impairment of a benefit does not depend on a literal
reading of the GAT or TRIPS agreements.2°4 GATT? provides for
remedies for impairments or nullifications of GAT/TRIPS benefits
present, this Note will assume that a state would be bound by treaty obligations.
at arts. 31(c)-(e).
201. See id.
202. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S.
1 [hereinafter GATT].
1700,55 U.N.T.S. 194, as amended, 1996, art. XXIII, cl.
2.
203. See id. at art. XXIII, cl.
1.
204. See id. at art. XXIII, cl.
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when the impairment is the result of
(a) the failure of another [treaty member] to carry out its
obligations under this Agreement, or
(b) the application by another contracting party of any measure,
whether or not it conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement, or
20 5
(c) the existence of any other situation.

Thus, a foreign government could argue that the recourse to state
judicial mechanisms may result in the impairment of either benefits
arising under GATT or of an objective of GATT or TRIPS.
Article 41 of TRIPS sets out general obligations of treaty
members with respect to treatment of all intellectual property
enforcement, not merely patents. Among those obligations is that
domestic intellectual property enforcement "shall be applied in such a
manner as to avoid the creation of barriers to legitimate trade and to
provide for safeguards against their abuse. ''206 Further, the
'207
enforcement procedures must not be "unnecessarily complicated.
If the enforcement methods are unnecessarily complicated, then the
country might be subject to a suspension of concessions. As this Note
has shown, the College Savings cases have left the method of
intellectual property enforcement extremely, if not unnecessarily,
complicated; enforcement of intellectual property rights against state
infringement is subject to the whims of the fifty states. Since states
should be liable under Article 31 of TRIPS, the United States is
violating the express language of its obligations. The question then
becomes, what can Congress do about it?
(2) The ConstitutionalLandscape

Article VI of the Constitution declares: "This Constitution, and
the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land. '208 Although simple in its terms, the exact extent of the power
of Congress pursuant to enacted treaties is uncertain, to say the least.
Could Congress, for example, pass legislation that it was not
otherwise authorized to do so under the Constitution, if it was in
furtherance of a treaty? More important for this Note's purposes,
could Congress pass legislation abrogating state sovereign immunity if
205.
206.
207.
208.

Id. (emphasis added).
1.
TRIPS, art. 41, cl.
See id. at art. 41, cl. 2.
2
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.
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it was required to do so by a treaty? The Supreme Court cases on the
treaty power give no definitive answer.
In Missouri v. Holland,20 9 the Court addressed the question of
legislative power obtained through a treaty. A federal district court
had ruled that a congressional statute to regulate the killing of
migratory birds within states was unconstitutional under the Tenth
Amendment, since the states, as sovereigns, had title to the birds that
Congress could not interfere with. 210 The President entered into a
treaty with the United Kingdom (as sovereign of Canada) to protect
these same migratory birds.211 Congress enacted implementing
legislation.212 In examining whether the treaty and its provision were
constitutional, Justice Holmes noted that "Acts of Congress are the
supreme law of the land only when made in pursuance of the
Constitution, while treaties are declared to be so when made under
the authority of the United States. '213 Holmes ruled that the treaty
and the implementing legislation were valid, since the treaty in
question did not "contravene any prohibitory words to be found in
the Constitution. ' 21 4 The Court upheld the statute as a valid exercise
of congressional power despite the fact that Congress had no
affirmative constitutional grant of power. 215 The Court specifically
stated that:
It is obvious that there may be matters of the sharpest exigency for
the national well being [sic] that an act of Congress could not deal
with but that a treaty followed by such an act could, and it is not
lightly to be assumed that, in matter requiring national action, 'a
reside in every
power which must belong to and somewhere
216
civilized government' is not to be found.
Holmes specifically warned that "we must realize that [the
founders] have called into life a being the development of which
could not have been foreseen completely.., by its begetters. ' 21 7 In
short, Holmes was advocating an expansive reading of the treaty
power that allowed for extra-constitutional powers. If this holding is
still good law, then Congress may indeed have the authority to
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

252 U.S. 416 (1920).
See id. at 432.
See id at 431-32.
See id at 431.
Id. at 433.
Id.
See id. at 435.
Id. at 433 (citation omitted).
Id.
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abrogate state sovereign immunity.
Holland did not address the issue, however, of what happens
when legislation enacted pursuant to the Treaty Power might run
afoul of some other constitutional provision, such as the Eleventh
Amendment. The case that has come closest to answering this
question is Reid v. Covert.218 Reid is an important case for examining
the nature of the foreign relations and treaty powers because it stands
out as an apparent limitation on congressional and executive power
over international affairs, and because of its examination of the
conflict between literal and expansive views of the Constitution it
warrants extensive review. Reid has been cited for the proposition
that in the regulating of foreign affairs, Congress may not enact
legislation that is forbidden by the Constitution.219 The holding in
Reid is much more complicated, and, perhaps, more limited than that.
The defendant in Reid, Mrs. Covert, killed her husband, an Air Force
sergeant stationed at an air base in England. 220 She was tried by
court-martial and without a jury under provisions enacted by
Congress pursuant to its Article I power221 as well as pursuant to an
executive agreement concluded with Britain allowing any citizens in
22
Covert's position to be prosecuted by an American court martial.
The Court had initially ruled that the legislation and the trial were
constitutional223 but then granted a petition for rehearing, 224 and
reversed itself in a very divided opinion. 225 The opinion is most
notable for the clash between literalist and expansive views of the
Constitution expressed in the various opinions. The plurality stated
bluntly, for example, that "[t]he United States is entirely a creature of

218. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
219. See, e.g., Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594,626 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
220. 354 U.S. at 3.
221. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
222. See Reid, 354 U.S. at 15 & n.29 (citing Executive Agreement of July 27, 1942, 57
Stat. 1193).
223. See Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470, 487 (1956) (Kinsella and Reid were
companion cases involving servicemen's spouses in Japan and England.).
224. See Reid v. Covert, 352 U.S. 901 (1956).
225. The initial vote in Kinsella was 5-3 with Justice Frankfurter "reserv[ing] an
expression of his views for a later date." Kinsella, 351 U.S. at 470. Two Justices who had
joined the majority opinion in Kinsella, Justices Reed and Minton, had left the Court
between the two cases. Justice Brennan, new to the Court, voted with the three dissenters
from Kinsella, Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black and Douglas, to form the plurality
in Reid. Justice Harlan, who had voted in the majority in Kinella, switched his vote and
concurred in Reid. Justice Frankfurter also concurred with the majority in Reid, while
Justice Whitaker took no part in the deciding of Reid.
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the Constitution. Its power and authority have no other source. '226
The plurality placed great emphasis on the subordination of military
power to civilian authority in holding that the trial without a jury was
unconstitutional, consuming eighteen pages of the United States
Reports on just that subject. 227 In the shorter, yet more germane, part
of the opinion, the plurality argued that "[ilt would not be contended
that [the Treaty Power] extends so far as to authorize what the
Constitution forbids, or a change in the character of the government
or in that of one of the States ... without its consent."= Even so, in

conceding the validity of Holland v. Missouri, the Court stated, "[t]o
the extent that the United States can validly [i.e., by its terms, not
unconstitutional] make treaties, the people and the States have
'229
delegated their power to the National Government.
Justice Frankfurter, on the other hand, in providing one of the
fifth votes in favor of Covert, was more expansive in his view of both
the Treaty Power and of Article 1, noting "Congress may sweep in
what may be necessary to make effective [an] explicitly worded
power." 230 Answering the issue presented, Frankfurter said, "is not to
be answered by recourse to the literal words" of the Constitution. 31
Moreover, only by considering the import of the Necessary and
Proper Clause "may be avoided a strangling literalness in construing a
document that is not an enumeration of static rules but the living
framework of government designed for an undefined future.' 'z32 In
any event, Frankfurter argued that because the offense charged was
capital, the provisions of the Bill of Rights were more directly
33
implicated than in other circumstances.2
Justice Harlan, providing the "other" fifth vote, while arguing
that "[u]nder the Constitution Congress has only such powers as are
expressly granted or those that are implied as reasonably necessary
and proper to carry out the granted powers, ''234 charted a middle
course between the plurality and Justice Frankfurter. Harlan agreed
with the dissenters that, setting aside for the moment the other
provisions of the Constitution, Congress was authorized to enact the
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

Reid, 354 U.S. at 5-6. (Black, J.) (plurality opinion) (footnote omitted).
See id at 23-41.
Id. at 17-18 (quoting Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890)).
Id. at 18.
Id. at 43 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id.
Id
See id. at 45-46.
Id. at 66 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment).
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23
legislation pursuant to Article I.
5 But to answer the question of
whether the conflict between the legislation and Bill of Rights was
fatal, required asking "which guarantees of the Constitution should
apply in view of the particular circumstances, the practical necessities,
'236
and the possible alternatives which Congress had before it."
Considering this was a capital case, Harlan agreed with Frankfurter
that the Bill of Rights was more directly implicated. 237
In dissent, Justice Clark side-stepped the Treaty Power and the
Necessary and Proper issue by arguing that the women in question
were a part of the military and therefore, since the due process clause
exempted military affairs from its ambit, the right to trial by jury was
not applicable. 2 8 What we have is not a repudiation of the concept of
expansive congressional authority in foreign affairs but an acceptance
by two Justices (and the controlling votes) of a balancing approach to
the inquiry. In short, Justices Harlan and Frankfurter imply that, in
certain circumstances, some constitutional provisions may be
abrogated by the Treaty Power or even the Necessary and Proper
Clause. The Harlan/Frankfurter balancing test may be a useful
source for the power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment state
sovereign immunity through the Treaty Power.
Unfortunately for this direct Treaty Power approach, the TRIPS
agreement has not been adopted as a treaty, but exists as the odd
extra-constitutional creature, a congressional executive agreement.
Such a creature is not, however, without power.239
In United States v. Curtis-Wright Export Corp.240 the Court
examined a similar issue. In 1934, Congress authorized President
Franklin Roosevelt to "consult[] with the governments of other
American Republics" and, if the President found that it would help
maintain peace in Bolivia, the President was authorized to make it
unlawful to sell arms or munitions to Bolivia. 241 The Supreme Court,
in a seven to one decision, 242 framed the question in terms of power.
Assuming that the delegation of power to the Executive to bind the

235. See id. at 70-73.
236. Id. at 75.
237. See id.
238. See id. at 80-89.
239. For an examination of executive and congressional agreements and their
relationship with the judiciary, see generally, Joel R. Paul, The Geopolitical Constitution:
Executive Expediency andExecutive Agreements, 86 CAL. L. REV. 671 (1998).
240. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
241. See id. at 312.
242. See id at 333. Justice Stone did not participate and Justice McReynolds dissented
without a written opinion.
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United States to a course of action involving external affairs would be
invalid if applied to internal affairs, the Court asked whether it could
be sustained on the ground that it was aimed towards an international
243
situation.
In deciding the question, the Court made several observations
regarding the relationship of the federal government to the states. In
international affairs, the Court asserted, the federal government is
sovereign. Moreover, "[t]he powers to declare and wage war, to
conclude peace, to make treaties, to maintain diplomatic relations
with other sovereignties, if they had never been mentioned in the
Constitution, would have vested in the federal government as
necessary concomitants of nationality." 244 Thus, the argument could
be made that there are powers the federal government has to manage
its international affairs that are independent of the Constitution.245
This seems a slender reed on which to build a direct abrogation of
state sovereign immunity. It must be stressed, however, that the
Supreme Court has been generally deferential to the executive's
ability to manage international affairs. 246 With TRIPS, we have an
agreement negotiated by the President pursuant to an Act of
Congress. As a treaty (or as a quasi-treaty), it confers obligations on
the United States to act in a certain way. If it does not, it runs the risk
of incurring threats to its economic security. As Curtis-Wright, Reid,
and Holland point out, the federal government has certain powers
beyond those enumerated in the Constitution when it comes to
international matters. One of these must be to enact legislation it
would not otherwise be entitled to do in order to fulfill its obligations.
Finally, lest it be argued that the federal government could
simply negotiate treaties to grant itself extra-constitutional powers, it
must be noted that there are deeply-rooted limitations on its abilities.
In considering the power of the Legislature to enact laws "necessary
and proper" to other explicit grants of power, Chief Justice Marshall
gave an expansive view of the necessary and proper clause.247 He
noted, however, that

243. See id at 315.
244. Id. at 318.
245. But see Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957), where at least four justices held that the
federal government's power to act in international situations was limited by the
Constitution, particularly the guarantees to individuals in the Bill of Rights.
246. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (upholding the power of
executive agreement under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act to a
constitutional attack).
247. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,420 (1819).
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should Congress, under the pretext of executing its
powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects
not entrusted to the government; it would become the
painful duty of this tribunal, should a case requiring
such a decision come before it, to say that such an act
248
was not the law of the land.
This pretext bar 249 provides a powerful limit to Congress. It allows
the Supreme Court to serve as a check against a grab for power that is
obviously an attempt to circumvent a prior constitutional restraint
(for example, a treaty with Canada to forbid gun sales and advertising
within a particular distance of the school in direct contravention of
United States v. Lopez250 ). Combined with the Frankfurter/Harlan
balancing test from Reid, it allows Congress and the executive just
enough power and flexibility to control and manage the United
States' external affairs.
D. Proceeding Under a Quid Pro Quo Theory
One theory that this Note would like to advance is what might be
termed the "simple quid pro quo solution."5 1 It has the advantage
(or disadvantage) of having no case law to oppose (or support) it. It
also depends on the unique features of the intellectual property
system, and the fact that both states and private citizens are
participants in the federal intellectual property system.
This theory derives from the fact that there is nothing in the
Constitution that states that Congress must protect the intellectual
property rights of states. Indeed, Congress need not really protect
any intellectual property rights at all. The Constitution merely allows
Congress to pass such laws to encourage the development of the
248. 1& at 423.
249. I am grateful to Calvin R. Massey for suggesting this line of inquiry.
250. 514 U.S. 549,551 (1995).
251. The Glauberman and Williamson pieces make some passing reference to this
theory. See Glauberman, supra note 10, at 87 n.145, and Williamson, supra note 10, at
1759. Glauberman consigns the discussion to a footnote, cites the Williamson note, and
then disparages it. See Glauberman, supra note 10, at 87 n.145. Williamson either
assumes that the spending power and a "quid pro quo" power are the same or has allowed
a typo. See Williamson, supra note 10, at 1759 ("Even without the authority to compel
states and state agencies to appear in federal court, Congress could condition its grant of
federal monies to a state on the state's waiver of its Eleventh Amendment sovereign
immunity. Thus, in the intellectual property arena, Congress could deny a state university
or research institution copyright and patent protection for original works and inventions
unless the state agreed to waive its Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity."). Neither
author devotes any further time to this theory.
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"sciences and the useful Arts." Congress could therefore suspend the
recognition of future intellectual property rights that would otherwise
belong to the states.252 In fact, although the Court has stated
conclusively that Congress may not abrogate state sovereign
immunity pursuant to its Article I powers, it has not stated that
Congress may not condition waiver of sovereign immunity on the
exercise of its Article I powers. The only contrary indication is the
dicta in the College Savings case that states that a conditional waiver
is unconstitutional when rejection of the condition would exclude the
state from an otherwise lawful activity.25 3 This proposition was not
only unnecessary to the decision in College Savings, it was
unsupported by any precedent whatsoevern 54
There is a more significant rejoinder to this objection, however.
The Court in both College Savings cases notes the scant evidence of
intellectual property infringement by the states. If this amount of
evidence reflects reality, then the impact of such a condition on the
states is minimal and therefore not coercive. If, on the other hand,
this amount of evidence does not reflect reality, and there is a large
amount of intellectual property owned by states and state entities,
then surely the College Savings threshold for the amount of evidence
for Congress to pass remedial legislation pursuant to Section 5 has
been reached. Either way, then, Congress could protect intellectual
property rights.
The application of the quid pro quo theory is simple; Congress
merely refuses to recognize future state intellectual property rights
until such time as that particular state waives its sovereign immunity
to suit for intellectual property right infringement. This does not
commandeer the state legislatures,25 5 neither is it outright
compulsion.256 The state does not need to develop intellectual
property and, moreover, the choice for the state is between doing
nothing or accepting a state of affairs that existed before College
Savings.
Alternatively, Congress could simply refuse to recognize state
entities as valid holders of intellectual property rights. Again, nothing
in the Constitution requires Congress to protect the intellectual
252. It would have to be "future" rights since the suspension of prior rights would
almost certainly be a taking of state property by the federal government.
253. College Savings, 527 U.S. 666,687 (1999).
254. See id.
255. As forbidden by New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (invalidating
congressional legislation because it commandeered state legislatures).
256. Although it is, admittedly, draconian.

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 51

property of the states. Congress could simply refuse to allow state
entities to have "title" to intellectual property rights and force them
to be maintained by individuals who would not be subject to Eleventh
Amendment immunity. Although more draconian than the "simple"
quid pro quo theory, it is not coercive in the least; nothing is expected
from the states, and nothing is given in exchange 5 7 Bear in mind
that either solution works only because of the peculiar nature of
intellectual property-both citizens and states can infringe each
others' rights. This scenario seems unique to this area of law; for
example, one could not imagine a state suing an individual citizen for
disability discrimination against it. As such, its application to other
sectors of law would be limited, to say the least.
E. Qui Tam Suits

One possible suggested solution that bears at least some
consideration is whether the United States government could allow
suits against states through what are called qui tam actions. Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity does not extend to suits conducted
against them by the United States.Z2 8 Qui Tam actions allow private
citizens to sue on the United States' behalf.359 Jonathan R. Siegel has
proposed using such actions to "get around" state sovereign immunity
in a variety of contexts, but particularly in the intellectual property
context. 260 Siegel's approach would require Congress to set up a
penalty for state infringement of intellectual property rights.261 The
holder of the intellectual property right at issue would sue the state
on behalf of the United States and, if successful, would have that
amount disbursed back to the holder. 262 This remedy is not only of
dubious constitutionality, 263 but also of extreme complexity. Such a
regime would certainly run afoul of the United States' treaty
257. One might call it the "taking the ball and going home" solution.
258. See United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 646 (1892); accord West Virginia v.
United States, 479 U.S. 305,311 (1987).
259. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729.31 (1994).
260. See generally Jonathan R. Siegel, The Hidden Source of Congress's Power to
Abrogate State Sovereign Immunity, 73 TEx. L. REv. 539 (1995).
261. See id. at 552.
262. See id.
263. See, e.g., Glauberman, supra note 10, at 102-04.
Glauberman rests his
constitutional argument on West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994). Under
West Lynn Creamery, Glauberman argues, two constitutional procedures do not
automatically add up to a constitutional program. See Glauberman, supra note 10, at 103.
This may simply be a restatement of the pretext qualifier, but is, at the very least, not a
stricture of general applicability.
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obligations under TRIPS.
VI. A Cursory Examination of Senate Bill 1835
In the fall of 1999, Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont proposed
Senate Bill 1835, the Intellectual Property Restoration Act.264 The
Act's purpose is to "restore Federal remedies for violations of
intellectual property rights by States. '265 The act essentially kicks
states and state entities out of the "Federal intellectual property
system" unless a state "opts in" to the system. 266 In order to opt in to
that the state agrees to
the system, a state must make an "assurance"
267
waive its sovereign immunity in future suits.
If a state then asserts its sovereign immunity in breach of this
assurance a variety of consequences flow. For example, all pending
applications are abandoned; 268 no liability may be had for
infringement of state patents for five years prior to the breach of the
assurance; 269 and the state may not opt back in to the system for one
year after the breach of the assurance ° The bill then couches much
of the remedial language that is to be inserted into the various
intellectual property acts in terms of constitutional violations.27 1
There are several problems with this remedial scheme. First, the
overly punitive measures invoked by the breach of assurance may run
afoul of the language in both South Dakota v. Dole and College
Savings272 that cautions against coercive measures taken against the
states. A better solution would be to predicate future intellectual
property rights on an actual waiver of immunity. Then, if a state
reneges, it may simply not sue to protect its intellectual property
rights from that point until it reinstates the waiver. Second, the
remedial constitutional language may be viewed skeptically as an
attempt to redefine constitutional rights-there is no language in the
Bill to distinguish willful violations of constitutional rights (which can
be remedied) from negligent violations (which can't). The Bill,
264. See S. 1835,106th Cong. preamble (1999).
265. Id.
266. Id.at §111(a).
at § 111(b).
267. See id.
at § 113(a).
268. See id.
at § 113(b).
269. See id.
at § 113(c).
270. See id.
id.at § 296 ("Any State that takes any of these rights [under the fifth or
271. See, e.g.,
fourteenth amendments][ ] shall be liable to the party injured... for the recovery of that
[ ]Reasonable and entire compensation
party's reasonable and entire compensation ....
may include damages, interest, and costs ...[and] attorney fees.").
272. See supranotes 154-55, 188-89 and accompanying text.
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although on the right track, tries too hard and attempts too much.
Conclusion-The Perils of Counting on Enumerated Powers
More than anything else, the ongoing debate over the Eleventh
Amendment, its impact on intellectual property right holders, and
Congress' frantic search for a remedy, points out the difficulties in
depending on the literal words of the Constitution. The Eleventh
Amendment, according to the Supreme Court, does not mean what it
says. The treaty power can give Congress powers not explicitly
contained in the Constitution even when the document at issue isn't
really a treaty. What may be in store for the future depends entirely
on the next people appointed to the Supreme Court.
The Eleventh Amendment was considered a dead letter before
the Supreme Court breathed new life into it after Seminole Tribe.
The federal-state relationship was thought to be well-settled and
federal law the rule of the land. As both the great public research
universities and private research companies took advantage of looser
restrictions on patentable subject matter to obtain more and more
patents, everything seemed fair. But with the College Savings cases
and Alden v. Maine, the Supreme Court has altered the balance. As
this Note has shown, the decisions have made it more difficult to hold
states accountable for the wide variety of activities that they are
engaged in. The patent holder of the latest gene therapy may be
forgiven for being shocked that her rights have been undermined by
reference to centuries-old precedent.
It could be that this might amount to no more than a tempest in a
teapot; states can still waive their sovereign immunity. In Kimel,
Justice O'Connor noted that many states had done just that in the
ADEA context. The problem is that this forces intellectual property
holders to look to states for protection. The drafters of the
Constitution explicitly made the federal government the protector of
these rights. Any other outcome goes against the very structure of
"dual federalism" which the Constitution is supposed to represent.
This Note has shown that all is not lost, however; there are
creative avenues left open, if one is daring enough to try them. The
problem is that these avenues are just that, daring. Whether it's the
slender reed of the Treaty Power, or the near-coercive sweep of the
simple quid pro quo theory or the Intellectual Property Restoration
Act, the legislative road is uncertain and of doubtful efficacy. With
one fell swoop, the Supreme Court has introduced uncertainty where
there was surety, inconsistency where all was settled. In the final
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analysis, one is left with the suspicion that the one actor who has
interfered most with expectations (investment-backed or not) is the
Supreme Court itself.

